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BOOK REVIEW
THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY. By Lee C. Bollinger. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986. Pp. viii, 295. $19.95.
Reviewed by Vincent Blasi*
In this important book, Professor Bollinger seeks to understand
and remedy the inadequacy he perceives in the way our legal culture
deals with extremist speech. He argues that the high level of protection
the first amendment has been construed to require serves a social function that has not been fully recognized or carefully evaluated. His thesis is that the contemporary social function of the idea of freedom of
speech is to help the society develop a general capacity for tolerance, a
capacity that determines how we respond to many forms of conduct as
well as speech. Once this function is appreciated, several familiar features of first amendment doctrine and rhetoric no longer seem justifiable. But one of the otherwise puzzling features of the first amendment
tradition-the tendency to push the idea of freedom of speech to an
extreme-takes on new meaning in light of the quest for a general capacity for tolerance.
In essence, Bollinger claims that speech acts should be accorded
an extraordinary degree of constitutional protection not because they
cause less harm, have more value, or are in any other respect different
than nonspeech acts, but precisely because speech acts are similar to
nonspeech acts. For Bollinger believes that a society, just like an individual, can best develop certain capacities by isolating one manageable
sphere of operation and undertaking an effort at self-improvement to
an extreme degree in that sphere. In this book, as in his earlier work,1
he builds on the premise that asymmetry has a crucial role in legal anal* Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School.
I am indebted to Bruce Ackerman, Robert Amdur, Harold Edgar, Kent Greenawalt,
and Andrzej Rapaczynski for their criticisms and suggestions. I should report that Professor Bollinger is a former colleague and longstanding personal friend of mine, and
that I have discussed this book with him throughout the period of its gestation. If the
only useful function of a book review were to provide an objective evaluation of the
author's product, I surely would be unqualified for the task. But I believe a book review
can also be a valuable forum for the continued exploration of ideas introduced by the
author. As someone whose professional life is spent wrestling with the same problems
that engage Professor Bollinger, I want to have my say in print about a book that I

regard as unusually interesting.
I. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 26-37 (1976).
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ysis, that similar phenomena sometimes should be treated differently as
a means of achieving the goals of the legal system.
Unlike other first amendment theorists, Bollinger thus is not troubled by the possibility that speech may not be so valuable as is commonly assumed, or that the harms that speech causes may be every bit
as great as the harms caused by conduct that most of us wish to see
regulated. In fact, Bollinger even provides some original and powerful
arguments that show how traditional discourse about the first amendment is based on a seriously distorted assessment of the benefits and
harms that flow from speech. In his view, however, speech need not be
special in order to be treated specially.
What does trouble Bollinger is that the best reason for protecting
extremist speech-the contribution such a gesture can make to the development of a general capacity for tolerance-seldom surfaces in discussion about free speech. Instead, judges, academicians, and social
critics continue to claim either that the value of extremist speech outweighs its harm, or that government cannot be given the authority to
regulate extremist speech because such a grant of authority is likely to
result eventually in the censoring of speech that really is valuable. Bollinger thinks analysis of free speech issues should not rest on dubious
assumptions regarding the value of speech or the risk of government
overreaching. Rather, the focus should be on the problematic nature of
the response that typically is engendered-in virtually all of us-by extremist speech. That response is one of instinctive intolerance. It is a
response we must recognize in ourselves and learn to control in a variety of settings: when wielding the power of the state against the many
forms of conduct we perceive as threatening, when exercising the considerable power of social opprobrium, and when trying to live in harmony with friends and loved ones. Bollinger claims that until
discussion of the principle of free speech better reflects the underlying
social function he has identified, that social function will not be as well
understood or as well served as it could be.
I.
Throughout the book Bollinger uses as a point of reference the
highly publicized controversy that ensued when a group of self-styled
American Nazis asserted a first amendment right to hold a demonstration, while dressed in storm trooper regalia, in the village of Skokie,
Illinois, a community notable for its large Jewish population and considerable number of residents who were concentration camp inmates
during World War II. One of the features of that dispute that intrigues
him is the disparity between what many observers took to be the appropriate legal and nonlegal responses to the proposed Nazi demonstration (pp. 12-14). That is, influential groups and commentators
believed the Nazis' legal claim presented an easy case. The principles
of the first amendment, it was asserted, unequivocally prohibited the
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courts from denying the Nazis the right to march. It is impermissible,
in this view, for legal prohibition to be based on the judgment that the
Nazis intended to proclaim an evil doctrine, or chose a venue and style
of communication designed to maximize ideological provocation, or
themselves may not believe in the principle of free speech. On the
other hand, virtually all those who asserted that the Nazis had a legal
right to demonstrate under the first amendment made a point of denouncing the ideas of the Nazis in the strongest terms, heaping scorn
and ridicule on the group to an extent limited only by shortcomings of
imagination and eloquence. This willingness to denounce the Nazi
creed was exhibited even by the state and federal judges who ruled in
favor of the Nazis' legal claims. In addition, the executive director of
the ACLU, which represented the Nazis, wrote a book defending his
organization's stance in the case but felt it necessary to remind his readers of his impressive credentials as a Nazi hater.2 Why, Bollinger asks,
should a legal culture feel so comfortable denouncing a set of ideas and
the people who hold them and yet feel itself powerless to employ legal
sanctions against those ideas? More than that, why should our legal
culture even take a seemingly perverse pride in its unwillingness to
punish or prohibit such extremist speech?
Bollinger attributes the disparity between legal and nonlegal responses to extremist speech to the fact that the idea of free speech has
evolved into a kind of cultural symbol, and as such is more or less immune from critical scrutiny and the demands of proportionality. Because our legal culture so celebrates the idea of free speech, and
derives much of its identity from its commitment to that idea, "our critical faculties may be unconsciously suspended when we are in its presence, an ironic result given the commonly understood purpose of the
principle to remove the shackles on dissent and to encourage openness
of mind" (p. 23).
Bollinger's concern goes well beyond the failure he perceives in
the way the legal culture responds to a dispute at once so poignant and
so bizarre as the Nazi-Skokie controversy. He recounts (pp. 15-22)
how the eminent scholar of evidence, Professor John Henry Wigmore,
accused Justice Holmes of pushing the idea of free speech to an unwar3
ranted extreme in his now legendary dissent in Abrams v. United States.
Why, Wigmore asked, should a democracy committed to peaceful
change have to tolerate advocacy of the idea of armed revolution
against properly constituted authority? Why also should tolerance be
extended to persons who would not allow free speech were they themselves in power? Bollinger claims that traditional justifications for free
speech do not really meet Wigmore's challenge. When the question is
framed not in terms of whether free speech is a good idea in general
2. See A. Neier, Defending My Enemy (1979), discussed by Bollinger at pp. 97-100.
3. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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but whether that good idea should be taken to the extremes that it has,
Bollinger suggests that Wigmore's arguments cannot be dismissed
lightly: "Where else in life do we regard it as desirable to ignore that
which is thought harmful until the final moments when the harm is
about to occur? Solicitude for those bent on individual and social injustice seems an odd virtue" (pp. 35-36).
Two familiar aspects of traditional first amendment reasoning
strike Bollinger as highly revealing of the unwillingness of free speech
proponents to defend forthrightly the decision to protect extremist
speech. He observes how often judges assume the posture of choicelessness in applying first amendment doctrine to extremist speakers.
Thus, the language of the first amendment is said to brook no exceptions. Or the history of the adoption of the first amendment is deemed
controlling. Or particular doctrines developed by the Supreme Court
are claimed to foreclose the consideration of arguments that might
otherwise justify the regulation of extremist speech. Bollinger dismisses these claims of choicelessness as unconvincing. He shows, for
example, how the courts in the Skokie case might have ruled against the
Nazis by construing certain traditional doctrines (fighting words, obscenity, clear-and-present-danger, time-manner-place regulation,
group libel) in particular ways, but instead disclaimed the authority to
do so (pp. 30-33). He suggests that these courts, like many before
them in other cases, presented themselves as choiceless so as to avoid
the difficult task of defending the decision to protect extremist speech.
A second aspect of traditional reasoning in first amendment cases
that Bollinger treats as confirmation of his avoidance hypothesis is the
excessive concern for line-drawing problems. He acknowledges that
fear of the proverbial slippery slope can be a legitimate consideration in
legal reasoning, but he denies that the problem takes on special dimensions when a legal standard turns on the content of speech. In many
areas of law, he observes, we learn to live with uncertainty and the everpresent risk that indeterminate standards will be misapplied. He analogizes line-drawing arguments to legal fictions, and asserts that "the
line-drawing claim is one of the most beguiling methods of obfuscation
and diversion in legal argumentation, one that often serves as a convenient disguise for other purposes and motivations" (p. 37). Introducing a personal note, Bollinger states that he would not feel his own
freedom to speak his mind threatened by the kind of exception that
courts would have to make to deny the Nazis the right to demonstrate
in Skokie (p. 38).
Given the disdain we all must feel for the Nazis' creed and for the
motivations that must have lay behind their plan to demonstrate, given
the sympathy we all must feel for the sensibilities of survivors of the
Holocaust, and given the manageability of the line-drawing problem in
this context, Bollinger asks why courts and legal scholars should have
been unwilling to find ajustification for ruling against the Nazis in their
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dispute with the village of Skokie. More generally, he asks why our
legal culture should assume the posture of choicelessness when confronted with the claims of extremist speakers when in fact choice does
exist.
II.
One reason Bollinger offers for the evasive quality of much talk
about the principle of free speech is the failure of modern judges and
commentators to adapt an eighteenth century concept to twentieth century realities. The first amendment was conceived during the Enlightenment, when the two dominant political ideas were that government
possesses only limited power which must be kept in check and that the
common people who make up the citizenry are competent to control
their own political destiny (pp. 44-45). At that time, communities were
small and homogeneous as compared to their modem counterparts,
and the problems of technological mass culture were unknown. Democratic theory was in its infancy; the memory of absolute sovereigns was
fresh. The way of thinking about free speech that we inherited from
that era, which Bollinger denominates the classical model, understandably emphasized the role speech plays in the search for truth, in the
processes of democratic decisionmaking, and in the development of the
human personality. The harms that speech was perceived to cause were
limited to the risks of persuasion to antisocial conduct and of personal
offense to addressees. It was, by modem standards, a simple world.
Today, however, the regulation of speech seldom proceeds from
anti-democratic impulses. It is the majority, asserting the prerogatives
of democratic sovereignty, that typically demands that extremist speakers be silenced (pp. 50-51). More than a commitment to citizen control
over officialdom is needed to justify the principle of free speech under
these circumstances. And yet so much modem first amendment analysis continues to invoke the rhetoric of self-government without explaining why the principle of majority rule does not extend to decisions
regarding how much extremist speech to tolerate.
Bollinger recognizes, of course, that just as the principle of liberty
does not grant a person the freedom to sell himself into slavery, the
principle of democracy does not grant a transient majority the power to
disenfranchise nascent majorities by punishing all public criticism of
those in power. But that concession hardly blunts the point that the
rudimentary concept of eighteenth century democracy cannot begin to
justify, and may even undercut, the extremes to which the principle of
free speech has been taken in modem times:
[I]t would seem reasonably clear that few if any of the restrictions on speech we have encountered over the last sixty years,
and the rejection of which now form the basis of our First
Amendment jurisprudence, could be fairly described as jeopardizing the elemental structure of a democracy-or, stated
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another way, that the absence of these regulations was the sine
qua non of a democratic political system (p. 51).
This is not to say that a particular democratic majority may not be prudent to allow much more free speech than the minimal conditions of
democracy require. But then the justification for free speech shifts
from the demands of democratic theory to an assessment of the practical consequences of toleration.
The classical model of free speech also addresses this matter of
practical consequences, but does so, according to Bollinger, in a way
that fails to account for some important modem realities. For example,
the model assumes that all ideas, even the most implausible and the
most extreme, contribute in one way or another to the search for truth.
Bollinger contests that assumption. He does not deny that vigorous
challenge has upset many fighting faiths: "From personal experience,
all of us can draw on numerous instances where the process of open
discussion advanced our understanding and led us to abandon falsehoods we once held as firm truths" (p. 54). Moreover, he duly notes
John Stuart Mill's argument that even falsehood contributes to the
search for truth by causing society's perception of the truth to be clarified and defended in the process of refuting falsehood. Nevertheless,
Bollinger remains unconvinced that the public expression of ideas such
as racial superiority or the propriety of genocide serves any meaningful
truth-seeking function:
The more we believe in the immorality or error of the ideas
being expressed through the speech, the more attenuated is
the truth-seeking advantage claimed as the justification for the
free speech principle. The "value" to us in these terms ranges
from remote to none. Just as in [the] libel area the Court has
sometimes recognized no "value" in defamatory false statements offact, so we might appropriately extend that to at least
some portion of the realm of opinion as well (p. 54).
One way to reject false ideas is to refute them. Another way, sometimes
more appropriate, is to regard them as unspeakable. "Like all human
activities, dialogue is not invariably useful under all conditions" (p. 56).
Just as he doubts the truth-seeking value of some ideas, Bollinger
questions the classical assumption that truth will always prevail over
falsehood in the marketplace of ideas. He quotes Alexander Bickel's
famous dictum on this point: "we have lived through too much to believe it."' 4 Bollinger concedes that true ideas may have a certain Darwinian capacity for survival, but he argues that the resilience of truth
hardly justifies the society in ignoring the harms caused by falsehood:
"[o]nly by recurring to the empty plea that we think in terms of 'the
long run' can anything be salvaged from the argument, and to nearly all
of us, it is rightly said, the long run will always come too late" (p. 74).
In this regard, he notes how in one of the legal culture's most impor4. A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 71 (1975), quoted by Bollinger at p. 74.
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tant truth-seeking endeavors, the jury trial, certain facts and arguments
are kept from the jurors on the assumption that selective censorship
aids rather than hinders the search for truth (p. 56).
One of Bollinger's most interesting criticisms of the classical
model concerns the types of harm that speech can cause. Traditional
analysis of free speech, he says, takes account only of the harms that
follow from persuasion or offense. But one of the most important and
potentially harmful consequences of the expression of an extremist
idea is the way such expression can force those who disagree with the
idea to respond. He explains how in the Abrams dissent Justice Holmes
recognized the problem but failed to consider its implications. In commenting on the impulse to censor, Holmes observed "[t]o allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent,
as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not
care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power
or your premises." 5 The important phrase here, says Bollinger, is
"seems to indicate." Holmes realized, in other words, that the response the society makes to speech-whether that response be censorship or toleration-is itself a statement:
The act of speech, therefore, puts those who know of it, and
who believe differently, in a serious dilemma. For them it is
not simply a matter of choosing not to be offended-perhaps
by "averting the eyes"-or a matter of standing like some outsider who is observing a process of potential persuasion at
work. The dilemma they face is significantly more complex,
for by doing nothing-by being tolerant-they may be contributing to the success of the beliefs they dislike. They are
now, like it or not, part of a dynamic process, from which they
can withdraw only at the risk of furthering that which they oppose. And that is why, as Holmes tells us, people in this situation are "naturally" inclined to "express [their] wishes in law
and sweep away all opposition" (pp. 62-63).6
In demanding a response, extremist speech helps determine the
agenda for public debate and private reflection. In a mass culture like
the twentieth-century United States, the power to influence the agenda
is the power to shape the society itself.
His exploration of agenda-setting and the communicative dimension of regulation leads Bollinger to conclude that the classical model
of free speech is based on much too simple a view of the interaction
between speakers and those who would regulate their speech. In his
view, intolerance is a complicated and not wholly pernicious phenomenon, and first amendment theory cannot afford to pretend otherwise.
5. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
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III.
Bollinger does not claim to be the first to recognize the inadequacy
of the classical model. In fact he thinks the assumptions of the classical
model, despite the lip service they have always been given, have not
really determined the way courts decide first amendment disputes or
the way critics analyze first amendment issues. He discerns a second
model of free speech analysis, also deriving from eighteenth century
patterns of thought, that exerts a more powerful if less explicit influence than the classical model. He calls this the fortress model.
The central premise of the fortress model is that the power to regulate speech is likely to be abused. "Every goverment bears within its
personality an atavistic longing to recapture the autocratic powers of its
ancestors. This reality, it is said, must be included in our calculations
about how to structure something as important and as vulnerable as the
First Amendment" (p. 77). The fear of instinctive and chronic overreaching by the government traces, of course, to the colonial experience and to the rather detailed philosophy of limited government that
captured the American imagination during the late eighteenth century.
This emphasis on the abuse of the power to regulate, says
Bollinger, has led proponents of the free speech principle to favor a
strategy designed to minimize the consequences of the anticipated
abuses. Thus, speech of dubious value and undoubted capacity to
cause harm must be accorded protection under the first amendment in
order to ensure that the core area of valued expression remains inviolate. The erection of such a doctrinal buffer zone is needed, so it is
claimed, to shield speakers from the enervating effects even of regulatory efforts destined to be disallowed by the courts, as well as from
judicial failures to protect speech due to routine errors of factfinding or
analysis or distortions introduced by the censorial pressures that sometimes compromise the independence of the judiciary. Under the fortress model, the consequences of tolerating a particular instance of
extremist speech, like that of the Nazis in Skokie, should not be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The frame of reference is more general,
and the perspective is strategic.
The fortress model does a far better job than the classical model in
explaining the posture of choicelessness that Bollinger detects in so
much of the rhetoric surrounding the first amendment. If politicians
are likely to abuse the power to regulate speech, then they must be
presented with a constitutional tradition painted in black and white, devoid of shades of gray. If judges are likely to succumb to regulatory
pressures in times of anxiety, then legal standards must leave the courts
as little scope for judgment as possible. Bollinger thinks the fortress
model lies behind the otherwise curious insistence of many free speech
proponents that first amendment claims not be justified with reference
to social consequences or specified ideals:
Given this view of the world, it seems both sensible and imper-
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ative to take a position in defense of free speech in which essentially no thought is permitted: free speech is simply a
"right" that each individual possesses against the larger society and that need not be defended on any other basis. It is
elemental, beyond argument, a priori (p. 90).
What most differentiates the fortress model from the classical
model is the pessimistic view of human nature embodied by the fortress
model. Bollinger illustrates how most of the leading philosophers of
free speech have commented upon the apparent strength of the human
impulse to be intolerant toward the speech with which one disagrees.
Observations to this effect can be found in the writings of Socrates,
Mill, Mark Twain, Walter Bagehot, Learned Hand, Chafee, Holmes,
and Meiklejohn (pp. 79-86). Bollinger is deeply impressed by this
common refrain:
One might even say that no more disparaging, and despairing,
view of the nature of the average person, of his and her natural
tendency to be intolerant, is to be found than in the libertarian
literature on the subject of free speech. The impulse may ebb
and flow, possibly affected in its movements by the moons of
economics or of war, but it is ever-present and ever ineradicable, so deep is it etched into the human character (pp. 82-83).
He detects in these reflections on the wellsprings of intolerance an assessment of the human character that is at odds with the faith in the
power of reason that informs the classical model of free speech. In this
regard, he thinks the fortress model is more realistic than the classical
model, and more in tune with modern thought.
Nevertheless, in the end Bollinger finds the fortress model unsatisfying, both as an explanation for the legal culture's response to extremist speech and as a source of normative guidance for interpreting the
first amendment. He thinks the pessimistic view of human nature on
which the fortress model is based has implications that are in tension
with the way American constitutional law has isolated the problem of
legal regulation of speech and erected extraordinary safeguards against
that particular exercise of power. If the impulse to intolerance is so
strong, is it not likely to be manifested in intolerance toward all forms
of unconventional or threatening conduct? Once the focus shifts from
the worth of the activity regulated to the likelihood of abuse of the
power to regulate, is there any reason to treat speech as special? Moreover, if the strength of the impulse to intolerance is the worry, why are
we only concerned with legal regulation of speech? Why do we condone, and even applaud, the regulation of extremist speech by ridicule
and social opprobrium? Also, if intolerance is so dangerous, should we
not be especially sensitive to, rather than dismissive of, the harms that
are caused by extremist speech that preaches the message of intolerance, as does the Nazi creed? Many of the features of the legal culture
that originally provoked Bollinger's inquiry seem to him even more inexplicable from the perspective of the fortress model.
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Furthermore, Bollinger sees in the fortress model a paternalistic
mentality that he finds troubling: "The fortress strategy relies on the
abstract language of 'the majority,' 'the public,' 'the masses,' of 'they'
and 'we.' As such, it can be a beguiling posture to assume in the defense of the free speech principle" (p. 101). These elitist assumptions
lead Bollinger to question "the propriety of the tasks the fortress model
places on the shoulders ofjudicial institutions" (p. 101). He also criticizes the fortress model for fostering "an unfortunate manipulative
frame of mind, a warfare mentality where each side is tacitly setting the
rules by which future battles will be fought" (p. 102).
Finally, Bollinger finds the fortress model too modest in its ambitions. A convincing rationale for the free speech principle must somehow account for the pride our legal culture takes in the way the first
amendment has been extended to the most trivial and worthless instances of communication. In the United States, he observes, the decision to protect free speech to an extraordinary degree represents more
than just a defensive strategy born of the fear of government. It represents also an affirmative gesture, a cultural symbol important to our
collective identity.
IV.
This observation leads Bollinger to search for a new way of thinking about free speech that combines the attractive idealism of the classical model with the realistic view of the human character that he
considers the chief virtue of the fortress model. He is convinced from
his critical scrutiny of the two models that the key to this endeavor lies
in acquiring a richer understanding of the nature of the response that
speech generates.
Toward that end, Bollinger explores the impulse toward intolerance in more depth than has been thought necessary under the fortress
model. He seeks to discover not just whether there exists such an impulse in the human character and how strong that impulse is, but also
why we react the way we do to certain types of speech. He concludes
that the psychology behind censorship is much the same as the psychology behind racial and religious prejudice, as well as the psychology that
shapes the way most persons respond to criminal behavior and violations of sexual taboos. Central to the human response in all these various instances is a concern about the attitudes of the person whose
speech, conduct, or sometimes even mere status generates the
response:
What leads us to react with intolerance is, typically, a concern
with the mind perceived to be at work-with the way of thinking of the person or persons, whether that be political beliefs
or general attitudes or values or whatever one might call it;
and, equally important, with the fact that this thinking is essentially being communicated by the actions of those who hold, or
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appear to hold, these different beliefs, attitudes, or values (p.
112).
The impulse to be intolerant is, to Bollinger's mind, a force to be
reckoned with across a broad spectrum of social interaction. The effort
to tame that impulse can be regarded as one of the most important
endeavors of organized society. Several different provisions of the
American constitution reflect that priority. The strictures against racial
and religious discrimination can be viewed in this light. So too can the
elaborate requirements governing criminal trials. Looking beyond the
domain of individual rights, Bollinger observes that the success of a
democratic system of government is jeopardized by the impulse to
intolerance:
The feelings [of intolerance] must arise and must be controlled in the basic operation of a self-governing political society, where a willingness to compromise and a willingness even
to accept total defeat are essential components of the democratic personality. Democracy, like literature, it may be said,
requires a kind of suspension of disbelief (p. 117).
Other integral features of the social system such as the functioning of
bureaucracies and professions depend on this capacity of persons to
live with, and even act upon, the beliefs of others.
Thus, intolerance toward speech is not an isolated problem. The
response of intolerance toward speech is only one manifestation of a
general human tendency that has widespread consequences. Because
the various branches of intolerance share the same psychological root,
Bollinger believes that the way the legal system deals with intolerance
toward speech has significance that goes well beyond whatever impact
court decisions may have on the marketplace of ideas or the dignitary
interests of unpopular speakers. The recognition of first amendment
rights helps to shape the attitudes of the population, attitudes that determine how the universal impulse to intolerance will be channeled and
controlled in a variety of settings. "A central function of free speech,
therefore, is to provide a social context in which we collectively speak,
in a public and official setting, to an important aspect of what we might
think of as the intellectual character of the society" (p. 120).
But if the problem is general in nature and not peculiar to disputes
about speech, why is not the solution general also? Why single out first
amendment litigation for this ambitious enterprise of shaping the intellectual character of the society? Precisely because the enterprise is ambitious, Bollinger seems to say, it requires an extraordinary effort by
the legal system that cannot be undertaken on too broad a front. He
analogizes the project to personal efforts at self-improvement:
This bending over backward, pushing ourselves to an extreme,
often in a limited context, is common in life. We parcel out
our world in this way perhaps more than we recognize, certainly more than we acknowledge in the area of legal principles. We do so because it offers advantages over a
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homogenized existence: It can provide a more manageable
place in which to begin, where success is more likely and, if
achieved, will in turn strengthen future resolve. It also has the
great merit of allowing us to limit the costs of our mistakes,
which can have a liberating effect, permitting us to experiment
more freely and to take risks that would otherwise be inhibiting. It also allows us to focus attention with greater clarity
on the problem being addressed, whereas if it were treated
generally, it might get lost amid a sea of other problems (pp.
121-22).
Especially valuable is this use of an isolated context "when the capacity
we are trying to achieve is beyond the reach of the usual methods of
social control-when what is ultimately involved is a matter of attitude
and capacity for searching introspection" (p. 122). Thus, even if some
forms of speech may cause as much harm as many forms of conduct
that are commonly regulated, and even if government is no more likely
to abuse the power to regulate speech than other regulatory powers,
there may be good reason to accord the principle of free speech a preferred position in our constitutional jurisprudence.
This line of analysis, however, only explains why speech might sensibly be treated somewhat differently than conduct. If Bollinger is correct that the principle of free speech has been extended to an
implausible extreme, how can such a development be explained orjustified in the name of character formation? Throughout the book,
Bollinger invokes the Greek virtues of proportion and moderation. He
does so even when discussing the need to combat the impulse to
intolerance:
The feelings that generate excessive intolerance cannot be obliterated from social interaction, nor would we want them to
be. Like the desire for personal gain, the impulse of intolerance must be controlled and channeled toward good social
ends, not uprooted ....We are dealing with a matter of attitude, of balance and control (p. 123).
So how is a balanced attitude toward intolerance to be fostered by doctrinal extremism?
Bollinger recognizes the problem, and he provides a litany of reasons why the protection of extremist speech may serve the social function he has identified. First, if the judicial response is meant to
influence general social attitudes, that response may best achieve its
purposes when it is clear and dramatic: "The extremes tend to attract
attention, and that, as any educator or radical knows, can be pedagogically and symbolically advantageous" (pp. 124-25). Second, when the
focus is on the response speech evokes from those who would censor it,
a broad-brush approach to doctrine is almost a practical necessity: "It
is simply too difficult to make a case-by-case examination of legal restraints on speech to ascertain whether the underlying motivations are
of an improper variety. The problem of the impulse to excessive intol-
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erance is simply too elusive for that type of scrutiny" (p. 125). Third,
the power of the impulse to intolerance "must really be confronted by
creating something of an ethic against regulation, which will exert force
in the opposite direction, very much like the presumption of innocence
does in the context of the criminal jury trial" (p. 125). "'To straighten
a bent stick you bend it back the other way'" (p. 125). 7 Fourth, even
when a particular instance of extremist speech causes harms that far
exceed its benefits, many persons will want to regulate it for the wrong
reasons, for reasons of indiscriminate intolerance. The protection of
extremist speech under these conditions can help to control the general
impulse to intolerance. Here, shifting the focus away from the value of
the speech actually strengthens the case for protection. Fifth,
"[e]xtremist speech is very often the product or the reflection of the
intolerant mind at its worst.. ." (p. 126). The extreme gesture of tolerating extremist speech can serve the function, ironically but powerfully,
of holding up before us "that which we aspire to avoid" (p. 126).
These reasons, Bollinger asserts, provide a stronger justification for the
extremism of first amendment doctrine than any reasons one might derive from a commitment to the search for truth or a fear of government
overreaching. Thus he claims the general tolerance theory does a betterjob than either the classical or the fortress model of explaining why
the regulation of speech has been treated in our legal culture as so special a problem subject to such extraordinary constitutional strictures.
He also believes his theory helps to explain the dominant role the
judiciary has come to play in shaping our understanding of the first
amendment. For the educative function he sees as central to the free
speech principle requires the kind of "coherent and articulated explanation" that courts are well suited to provide (p. 134). Also, "[t]o a
degree more than with any other group, judges are expected to have
mastered the tolerant mind, to have the capacity to set aside their personal beliefs and predilections, and to control the impulses that accompany them as they set about interpreting and administering the
society's laws . .." (p. 134). Perhaps most important, "[t]he process of
judicial enforcement gives those opposed to the speech an institutionalized method of objecting to the speech, and thus at least partially the
opportunity of signifying their position with respect to it, and a result
(if the judicial decision is in favor of toleration) that is-partially or
ambiguously-'beyond their control'" (pp. 136-37). Hence the importance of the rhetoric of choicelessness.
V.
It is important to Bollinger that his theory not be viewed as just
one more imaginative proposal generated by the academic mind. He
7. Quoting M. Montaigne, Of Husbanding Your Will, bi The Complete Works of
Montaigne 769 (D. Frame ed. 1957).
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seeks to establish roots for the general tolerance theory in some of the
traditions of first amendment analysis. To that end, he attempts to
demonstrate that many features of the theory are implicit in the
thought of perhaps the two most important first amendment thinkers of
this century, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn and Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes.
Meiklejohn's writings on the first amendment, particularly his short
book, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government,8 have been enormously influential with both scholars and judges. Bollinger finds it
hard to account for this influence if one looks only to the power of
Meiklejohn's logic or the originality of his arguments. Others before
Meiklejohn had linked the idea of free speech with the concept of selfgovernment and the ideal of citizen participation in civic affairs.
Meiklejohn's distinction between public speech and private speech has
been much criticized, and in his later writings Meiklejohn seems evasive
if not confused about the distinction. Yet the stature of Meiklejohn as a
first amendment thinker seems to grow with each year. Why?
Bollinger contends that the true importance of Meiklejohn's work
lies in "its characterization of the meaning of the act of tolerance and
its counterpart of intolerance" (p. 154). Meiklejohn was primarily concerned with the goal of "creating a kind of democratic personality,"
and he viewed the constitutional protection of free speech as a means
to that end (p. 155). In the passages where Meiklejohn articulates what
it means to be a citizen, his writings achieve undeniable power. His
rhetoric implores the political community to have the courage to face
unpleasant ideas; he equates intolerance with fear. Meiklejohn sought
a democratic personality that exhibits concern for the welfare of the
whole community and faith in progress through knowledge and participation. Most of all, Meiklejohn wanted citizens with the energy, independence, and fortitude that stem from conviction. His own passionate
belief in self-government leaps off the pages of his books and articles
and accounts for much of his impact as a scholar.
From this perspective, the gesture of tolerating all ideas, even antidemocratic ideas, can be seen as a display of self-confidence by the
forces of democracy. At bottom, that was Meiklejohn's reason for believing that all public speech is protected by the first amendment. He
always described himself as first and foremost a teacher. It is not surprising then, says Bollinger, that Meiklejohn should have discerned the
teaching function of the free speech principle.
Justice Holmes professed a personal and political philosophy that
bears almost no resemblance to Meiklejohn's. Holmes delighted in expressing his disdain for ideologies, ideals, tenets, programs-anything
bearing the stamp of conviction. Holmes was a skeptic. He adopted
the intellectual stance of self-doubt. He considered truth nothing more
8. A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948).

1987]

THE TOLERANT SOCIETY

than the prejudices of those who at any moment possess the power to

enforce their views. He thought persons incapable of placing the welfare of the community above their individual interests.
But Holmes had one thing in common with Meiklejohn, Bollinger
argues. Each man viewed the first amendment as a vehicle for fostering
the type of personality he thought desirable. For Holmes, the reason to
protect worthless or dangerous speech is to remind people that "all life
is an experiment," that "time has upset many fighting faiths." 9 By refusing to ascribe legal significance to the evil quality of a speaker's
ideas, the legal culture endorses the intellectual stance of self-doubt.
So despite their antithetical outlooks on so many questions, Holmes
and Meiklejohn were united in the view that the free speech principle
serves primarily a teaching function:
The conflict between Meiklejohn and Holmes over the meaning of free speech was rooted in a shared effort to develop an
intellectual capacity that would be reflected in, and stretched
by the act of tolerance toward speech-but for one it was the
capacity of shared belief and community, and for the other it
was the capacity of self-doubt and individualism (p. 163).
Bollinger thus claims an impressive pedigree for his idea that a
central function of the free speech principle is to help develop qualities
of mind that come into play across a wide spectrum of social interaction. But if this view of the first amendment had such notable and eloquent champions as Holmes and Meiklejohn, why has the general
tolerance theory remained submerged in the literature of free speech?
Why do we still employ the thought patterns and rhetoric of the classical and fortress models?
Bollinger believes the explanation lies in the fact that Holmes and
Meiklejohn each urged upon the society a one-sided set of character
traits that could not, and should not, serve as the benchmark for cultural development. "Postures of self-doubt and affirmation of belief
must be regarded as unstable; each attempts to resolve issues that are
ultimately not resolvable, to settle for once and for all what cannot be"
(p. 174). What is needed is a more complex democratic personality
that combines elements of self-doubt and conviction, and even sustains
a creative tension between those perspectives. "We are, and must inevitably remain, fundamentally ambivalent toward the process we describe
as belief" (p. 174). In radically different ways, both Meiklejohn and
Holmes were not ambivalent about "the process we describe as belief,"
and for that reason failed fully to understand the nature and function of
intolerance. As a result, neither was able to work out a satisfactory interpretation of the first amendment.
9. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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VI.

Although he does not regard the endeavor as central to his inquiry,
in one chapter Bollinger explores some of the specific doctrinal implications of the general tolerance theory (pp. 175-212). He concludes
that the current structure of first amendment doctrine is not well suited
to the task of helping society channel and control the impulse to
intolerance.
He observes that modern judicial doctrine regarding free speech is
built around three basic principles. First is the clear-and-present-danger test, which in its most recent formulation permits speech to be regulated when it is both intended to and likely to incite imminent lawless
action. Second is the two-level concept, which permits certain forms of
communication such as fighting words and hard-core pornography to
be regulated without any showing of danger on the theory that such
communication lacks social value. Third is the content distinction,
which holds that regulations of speech that turn on the communicative
impact of the speaker's message require far more justification than regulations that turn on such ancillary physical consequences of the act of
communication as noise level, litter, and congestion.
Each of these principles is problematic, Bollinger thinks, when
considered from the perspective of the general tolerance theory. The
clear-and-present-danger test takes into account only the harms that
flow from persuasion. His critique of the classical model establishes
that speech can cause harm in other ways. The two-level concept assumes that the toleration of speech that lacks social value serves no
important function. To the contrary, the teaching of tolerance can be
particularly effective when the speech is widely perceived to be worthless or pernicious. The content distinction ignores the fact that intolerance toward the perceived quality of mind of a speaker can be
expressed by regulation of his choice of forum and style, as well as his
choice of explicit message. Because the acquisition of a general capacity for tolerance requires that "we give those wishing to confront us
with unpopular speech activity a serious and meaningful opportunity to
do so," disputes regarding the time, manner, or place of speech should
not be relegated to secondary status under the first amendment (p.
201).
In place of the current doctrinal structure, Bollinger proposes an
approach that is more flexible, more geared to the notion of pedagogic
potential, and more respectful of the strength of the impulse to
intolerance:
The starting point would seem to be this: Certain extraordinary times and conditions exist in any society in which it is
quite simply too much to expect of people that they be selfrestrained toward speech behavior, and under which it would
be counterproductive to the aspirational aims of free speech to
insist on toleration (p. 182).
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Turning to specifics, he concludes that fighting words should not
be protected under the first amendment because the human instinct to
react intolerantly when insulted face to face is simply too basic for constitutional doctrine to seek to control. He questions whether disputes
over the regulation of pornography provide a good context for teaching tolerance, since portrayals of sexuality touch such deep feelings going to personal and community identity and evoke such complex
responses: "The centrality of the sexual instincts to the personality
may provide the best explanation we have for the desire to isolate obscenity from the general area of toleration required by the First
Amendment" (p. 185). Defamation he views as likewise a problematic
context, both because the social need to preserve individual honor is
deeply rooted and thus hard to influence, and also because the regulation of defamation can promote as well as retard toleration since defamatory speech tends to evoke an intolerant response toward the
person who is defamed. A theme that runs through Bollinger's discussion of fighting words, obscenity, and libel is that those categories of
speech should receive less first amendment protection than others because of the problems they pose for the project of teaching tolerance,
not because of the judgment that such speech lacks social value.
In contrast, he concludes that the dispute between the Nazis and
the Village of Skokie provided a good setting for the judicial effort to
teach tolerance (197-200). The case was eye-catching; the nation was
watching. Attitudes of extreme intolerance were exhibited by participants on both sides of the controversy. Yet the dispute also was manageable, subject to judicial comprehension and control. The harms
threatened by the Nazi demonstration were not trivial but, despite
claims to the contrary by the residents of Skokie, those harms were not
so great or so pointed that judicially enforced toleration of the Nazis
was more than the society could reasonbly be expected to bear. Particularly because we have so little trouble concluding that the Nazis' creed
is pernicious and their motivation for preferring Skokie as a forum despicable, the case offered a good opportunity for the society to develop
its capacity to control the impulse to intolerance.
As these examples indicate, under the general tolerance theory judicial doctrine is highly responsive to the vagaries of social context.
That is not a new phenomenon: the clear-and-present-danger test also
takes social context into account in measuring the likely consequences
of speech. It might be argued, of course, that the contextual variables
that determine whether a speech creates a clear and present danger are
fewer and more susceptible to doctrinal enumeration than are the variables that determine whether a particular dispute, or category of disputes, is well suited to the teaching of tolerance. But Bollinger is not
troubled by the possibility that the doctrines his theory would generate
may be less formulaic and more flexible than traditional first amendment doctrines. In fact, he regards those qualities as highly desirable.
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His chapter on doctrinal implications is entitled "Drawing Lines and
the Virtues of Ambiguity."
Bollinger provides several reasons for his preference for flexible
and ambiguous doctrines. Flexibility is valuable because the pedagogic
impact of first amendment adjudication depends so much on shifting
social conditions. Ambiguity is especially important under the general
tolerance theory because the impulse to intolerance is itself an ambiguous social phenomenon, at once both healthy and dangerous. Moreover, the more flexible and ambiguous legal doctrine is, the more
litigation it invites. In most spheres, of course, this consequence would
hardly seem a recommendation. But in light of the unique teaching
function of first amendment litigation, we should welcome lawsuits in
this limited sphere, both to give those who are aggrieved by speech a
forum to express their intolerance in a controlled and responsible way
and to give courts the opportunity to expound on the meaning of tolerance (p. 195).
In preferring ambiguous and flexible doctrines, Bollinger does not
share the aversion of many first amendment scholars to balancing tests.
In his view, the methodology of balancing has produced distorted results primarily because the only interests placed on the speech side of
the scales have related to the social value of the communication at issue. Were courts also to give proper weight to the social value of learning toleration through enduring the harms caused by the speech,
balancing would often lead to the protection of unpopular speech (pp.
196-97).
VII.
Bollinger pays comparatively little attention to the doctrinal implications of his thesis in part becuse he believes the way the legal culture
talks about the free speech principle is at least as important as what
specific doctrines are adopted and what lines are drawn. Under the
general tolerance theory, judicial and academic rhetoric matters a great
deal. He devotes a full chapter to "searching for the right voice" (pp.
213-36).
He notes that the problem of free speech "has attracted what
seems like a disproportionate share of the most beautiful writing to be
found anywhere in the law" (p. 213). He attributes the first amendment's status as a cultural symbol in part to the rhetorical contributions
of Justices Holmes and Brandeis and Professors Chafee and Kalven.
Were the general tolerance theory to achieve the recognition Bollinger
thinks it deserves, good writing about free speech would become if anything even more important.
For this reason, however, Bollinger is concerned about some
prominent features of the traditional rhetoric of the first amendment.
That rhetoric, he thinks, is typically one-sided and exaggerated. The
history of the first amendment is glorified. Object lessons are dis-
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torted. The benefits of speech are overstated. The harms are minimized or ignored. The censorial tendencies of government are wildly
exaggerated. The motivations of those who would regulate speech are
impugned. Ironically, the rhetoric of the first amendment exhibits a
high degree of intolerance for any ideas or facts that support the regulation of speech.
Bollinger inquires why such a one-sided rhetoric should have
emerged. One explanation is that the early writers on free speech, particularly Mill and Chafee but also Brandeis, addressed the issue at times
when speech was indeed under severe attack (p. 223). These writers
responded as advocates. They exhibited passion and outrage. The
same can be said for Justice Black's opinions during the McCarthy era
(p. 224). This advocate's posture is understandable, but it did not yield
a free speech rhetoric that exemplifies the virtues of balance and
tolerance.
Another explanation for the unbalanced rhetoric of free speech lies
in the problematic nature of the judicial role in constitutional adjudication. Deep down judges know they cannot avoid drawing upon their
personal preferences when construing a constitutional provision like
the first amendment, with its highly indeterminate text, history, and
structure of precedent. Yet that reliance on personal preference is difficult to justify, or even to confront openly. And so judges adopt a rhetoric that minimizes the role of choice by characterizing free speech
disputes in one way or another as "easy" cases (pp. 225-26). The fact
that the legal culture has isolated the issue of free speech, artificially
separating it from issues relating to the regulation of conduct, fosters
this tendency to talk about the issue in unrealistic, one-sided terms.
Bollinger believes that a different kind of rhetoric would better
serve the function of teaching tolerance. He states it would be desirable "if those who defend and apply free speech-especially, of course,
as litigants andjudges-viewed it as a central lesson of free speech that
they themselves be wary of their own tendency to oversimplify or, in
effect, to censor, the complexity of the problems involved in the cases
they deal with" (p. 222). He recognizes that an oversimplified rhetoric
sometimes can serve as a counterweight to powerful regulatory instincts and can also contribute to the solidarity and resolve of those
who would champion the right of free speech. But he fears that a refusal in first amendment discussion to recognize the complexity of the
issues and the plausibility of the arguments for regulation tends to generate a cycle of intolerance.
Under the general tolerance theory, the goal of the free speech
principle is to develop in members of the society a particular type of
intellectual character that embodies such virtues as open-mindedness,
honesty, balance, a willingness to listen, and a willingness to accommodate. That character is best taught by example. "It seems a reasonable
assumption that if judges] are engaged in weaving a set of deceptions,
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of censoring reality for themselves and for others, neither they nor we
will achieve the goal" (p. 235).
VIII.
Bollinger devotes the brief concluding chapter of the book to a
series of suggestive speculations (pp. 237-48). He wonders whether
there is a link between the ethic of tolerance and the fragmented division of roles necessary in a large capitalist-bureaucratic society. He debates in his own mind whether the polyglot character of the nation of
immigrants accounts for the prominence of the free speech principle,
or whether instead the explanation lies in the fact that the United States
has exhibited a remarkable degree of shared values, as symbolized by
the two-party system. (He is inclined to believe the latter.) He re-emphasizes the point that the social function, and thus the meaning, of the
free speech principle is constantly evolving. "One generation may seek
merely the right to speak, while another will take strength from tolerating bad speech acts. Each generation has its own agenda, as the conditions then prevailing will dictate what subjects are important for
inquiry" (p. 242).
In a few revealing passages, Bollinger identifies what he sees as
some of the important strengths and weaknesses of his thesis. He
counts as a major strength of the general tolerance theory that it embodies "a view of free speech as having a moral dimension, of being
one public context in which the society addresses an important aspect
of the general quality of mind it seeks" (p. 242). He detects no comparable moral dimension in the fortress model or the various "process"
justifications for free speech. One of the major weaknesses of the theory, he believes, is that the teaching of tolerance could overshoot the
mark. There can be such a thing as an undesirable extreme of tolerance: "Tolerance and intolerance are not ends of a spectrum of good
and bad, even in the context of legal coercion against speech, despite
the frequent portrayal of them as essentially moral opposites" (p. 245).
Intolerance in moderation serves a social function; we could have too
little of it. Moreover, there exists a qualitative risk as well: the free
speech principle "could become a method of inculcating a kind of toleration that turns naturally into passivity and uncritical obedience" (p.
247).
Toward the end of the book, Bollinger lists some of the major assumptions of the general tolerance theory. They include "the assumptions about the nature and degree of the impulse to intolerance, about
the advantages of using speech as a discrete area in which to engage in
extraordinary self-restraint toward troublesome behavior, about the capacity of the judicial system to effectively implement such a principle,
about the role of law in shaping social attitudes generally" (p. 244). He
invites further efforts to test these assumptions. But he concludes the
book on a note of confidence about (I take it) both his thesis and his
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subject: "In the end, we must not fail to see the genuine nobility of a
society that can count among its strengths a consciousness of its own
weaknesses" (p. 248).

Ix.
There is much to admire in this book. It is elegantly written. It is
rich in perceptive observations. The analysis is balanced and never
hackneyed. The author displays a knack for producing the apt quotation and the thought-provoking analogy. The critiques he develops are
likely to prod many readers into reflecting afresh about some of their
long-held tenets regarding free speech. I found the book as interesting
on the third reading as on the first, and that has always seemed to me a
litmus test for a work of scholarship.
Although the book advocates a sharp thesis and even presents a
model, I think Bollinger's primary contribution lies in the discrete insights he offers and, appropriately, the quality of mind he reveals and
invites the reader to emulate. This is the antithesis of a book that
stands or falls with the persuasiveness of its central thesis. Nevertheless, because of the originality and sophistication of Bollinger's analysis, the general tolerance theory he proposes is likely to serve as one of
the reference points for future thinking about the first amendment. For
that reason, I wish to indicate why, though I have learned much from
this book and expect to learn more from it in the future, I do not find
its argument wholly convincing.
The general tolerance theory addresses the problem of freedom of
speech at several levels. In part, the theory is designed to explain the
cultural phenomenon that fascinates Bollinger-the tendency of many
participants in the political culture to push the idea of free speech to an
extreme and to treat the legal regulation of speech as a unique and
especially important issue. In part, the theory is intended to serve a
normative function at the level of individual choice: Bollinger offers
individuals a rationale for aspiring to extraordinary self-restraint when
confronted with ideas they find deeply threatening. In part, the general
tolerance theory is a theory of adjudication concerned with the criteria
that ought to determine how judges interpret the first amendment. It is
this last dimension that interests me the most and that I find most problematic. Although I have misgivings about other aspects of Bollinger's
argument, the criticisms I shall discuss pertain exclusively to the theory
of adjudication he develops.
Despite Bollinger's vigorous challenge to the conventional wisdom
on the subject, I still believe a good case can be made for the claim that
speech is indeed special, in the sense that the legal regulation of acts of
communication raises distinctive problems in a constitutional democracy. On this point, his generally illuminating construction and criticism of the classical and fortress models may have led Bollinger to
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overlook certain features of speech regulation that are not fully captured by those models.
In describing the classical model, he states "the practical benefits
of gathering information and ideas for the truth-building process continue to be the major attraction claimed for speech and hence the basis
of our contemporary theory for the free speech principle" (p. 45). He
demonstrates that the self-government theory of Alexander Meiklejohn
is really a version of the classical truth-seeking model confined to the
political arena: speech is seen as valuable because it contributes to informed decisionmaking by the electorate. But this focus on the search
for truth, leavened only by a brief consideration of the safety-valve
function of letting discontent surface, ignores two of the most important values served by political speech: participation and the checking of
power.
Even if Bollinger is correct, as I think he is, that the truth-seeking
benefits claimed for extremist speech are dubious, there is real value in
letting persons who hold extremist views participate in the processes
and rituals of governance. It is a significant gesture, symbolizing a reliance on consent rather than force, for a political community to treat its
most hated and irresponsible members as citizens nonetheless. "Silence coerced by law," said Brandeis, is "the argument of force in its
worst form."' 0 The point can be made into a conceptual argument:
the very legitimacy of majority rule depends on every member of the
electorate being free to communicate his views, at least on political issues. Even if one rejects this conceptual claim and adopts, as does
Bollinger, a method of analysis based on a comparison of the benefits
and harms of speech, the participation value of free speech ought to
weigh rather heavily in the balance. So far as I can discern, in
Bollinger's assessment of the classical and fortress models this value
receives no attention.
The classical and fortress models also fail to account for the distinctive role that communication plays in the process of checking
abuses of governmental authority. Such a rationale for the free speech
principle was emphasized during the eighteenth century. "[T]he right
of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon," Madison observed, is "the
only effectual guardian of every other right."" Often this checking
value is subsumed under the search for political truth. Recall, however,
that Bollinger discounts the truth value of speech because of his wellgrounded skepticism regarding how well the marketplace of ideas operates. The fact that "'we have lived through too much to believe'" (p.
74)12 that truth will outsell falsehood in the short-run by no means im10. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (BrandeisJ., concurring).
11. 4 Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 553-54 (1876), quoted in New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964).
12. Quoting A. Bickel, supra note 4, at 71.
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peaches the claim that free speech plays a special role in the process of
checking abuses of official power. Unlike the participation value, the
checking value may not require great solicitude for extremist speech,
and thus Bollinger is right to look elsewhere for an explanation of why
the first amendment has been construed to protect truly hateful and
harmful ideas. But the general tolerance theory is founded on the
broad claim that the regulation of speech by law is not materially different, in terms of general costs and benefits, from the regulation of conduct by law. The checking value, like the participation value, provides a
reason to question that claim.
Thus, at least some of the conventional arguments for treating
speech as special remain unsullied by Bollinger's fresh hard look at the
subject. On the other hand, the standard view of speech as special due
to its limited harm-causing capacity receives a trenchant and largely
persuasive refutation in the pages of this book. Even regarding the
question of harm, however, I find Bollinger's analysis unconvincing in
one respect.
He argues that the classical model fails to take into account the
harm speech can do by forcing its addressees to send a message by the
way they respond to the speech. The response of ignoring the speech
can be perceived as indicating agreement with it, or else indifference or
ambivalence toward it. The response of criticizing the speech but failing to have it regulated by legal sanctions can be perceived as indicating a lack of power or resolve to act on one's convictions concerning
the evil quality of the speech. But the force of this point depends on
what message is read into these ambiguous responses, and that depends in turn, at least in part, on the impact of first amendment doctrine and rhetoric on popular thought. In other words, the very
teaching function Bollinger identifies may help to save, rather than displace, the classical model.
This is more than a debater's point. As Bollinger notes, the traditional rhetoric of the classical model often tries to link the decision not
to regulate speech with such personal qualities as courage and calm. I
think the rhetoric has had an effect. The sentiment attributed to
Voltaire, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death
your right to say it,"13 is invoked frequently in popular discussion, both
public and private. The distinction between tolerance and agreement is
one that is easily explained and easily understood. For that reason, it is
a distinction that the rhetoric of law can effectively teach. The same
holds true, I believe, for the distinction between tolerance and
weakness.
13. Actually, the oft-quoted statement is a paraphrase, adopted by an American
newspaper as its motto, of a remark made by Voltaire in private correspondence. What
Voltaire said is "I detest what you wrote, but I would give my life to make it possible for
you to continue to write." Letter to A.M. de Riche, February 6, 1770, quoted and discussed in N. Guterman, A Book of French Quotations 188-89 (1963).
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Bollinger is convinced, however, that no amount ofjudicial or academic teaching will deter people from drawing inferences of "doubt
and weakness of resolve from the posture of passivity or tolerance-not
because they always coincide but because they do so with enough frequency that it provides a reservoir of human experience from which to
draw such inferences" (p. 64). Of course, the decision to tolerate extremist speech sometimes does indeed derive from covert agreement or
lack of regulatory resolve. The question is whether the connection is so
strong and so common that popular perception of the act of toleration
must inevitably be dominated by suspicions of agreement or weakness
on the part of those who decline to regulate speech. In this regard, I
think the dispute between the Nazis and the Village of Skokie provides
an atypical test case. There is a history and continuing sense of guilt
surrounding the question ofJewish confrontation with the Nazi mentality that makes the implicit message of toleration in that context
exceptional.
That Bollinger may overestimate the normal communicative costs
of the act of toleration does not impeach his other criticisms of the
classical model. I agree with him that the classical model is based on
too optimistic a view of human nature and too great a faith in the marketplace of ideas. But it is Bollinger's focus on the communicative significance of the regulatory response to speech that leads him to want to
replace the classical model with the general tolerance theory. My
doubts about how meaningful is the message conveyed by the act of
tolerating speech lead me to think he is wrong to regard the communicative impact of the regulatory response as a more important consideration than the censorial impact of regulation on the speakers and their
audiences.
The fortress model focuses on this matter of censorial impact.
Bollinger makes a number of penetrating observations about the fortress model; the chapter he devotes to the subject impresses me as perhaps the strongest in the book. But I believe he fails to give sufficient
attention to the familiar argument that officials who hold the reins of
regulatory power are particularly susceptible to impulses toward intolerance. His discussion of the fortress model is built around the proposition that in most instances the use of legal sanctions against speech is
stimulated by popular demand driven by the universal human impulse
to intolerance.
I do not doubt that there are occasions when widespread popular
sentiment or pressure from powerful private groups forces government
officials to regulate speech they might otherwise choose to tolerate. In
fact, the Nazi-Skokie controversy was one such occasion. 14 Moreover,
14. See D. Downs, Nazis In Skokie 22-23 (1985):
Once Skokie governmental officials dealt with Collin, they chose not to
counter Collin's plans for village hall. At a meeting held with other local leaders (including local rabbis and Chicago representatives of the Anti-Defamation
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the impact of public opinion is likely to be greatest during concentrated
periods when the first amendment stakes are highest, when disorienting
social and political developments lead officials and ordinary citizens
alike to perceive an urgent need to repudiate certain ideas.
I think it is a mistake, however, to minimize the role government
officials play in determining how widely and severely speech is regulated. In periods of relative tranquility, the issue of how dissenters are
treated seldom ranks high on the priority lists of the most influential
interest groups; official preferences rather than constituent pressures
typically determine what speech regulation policy will be implemented.
Moreover, even in periods of intense social conflict when constituent
pressures count for a lot, government officials can do much to stimulate
or defuse popular sentiment favoring the regulation of speech.
It stands to reason that government officials should find tolerance
of speech especially difficult. Speech is perceived to be dangerous because it challenges the social order or particular tenets thereof, or interferes in some other way with the smooth working of the institutions
of the society. Few persons have as much respect for or stake in the
social order as those who achieve positions of authority in perhaps its
most important institution, the state. That, in a constitutional democracy, power is diffuse, limited, and subject to recall only makes those
who hold that power for the moment all the more inclined to feel
threatened by challenges to their authority or policies. Particularly revealing is the way government officials have responded to speech in
spheres where they are essentially free of constitutional constraints and
pressure from public opinion. The longstanding practice of denying
visas to foreign visitors on ideological grounds is one manifestation of
the official mind at work. 15 Another is the way law enforcement agencies have chosen to deploy their scarce resources in the systematic surveillance of such menacing groups as the Socialist Labor Party and the
League) they decided to grant Collin's request for a permit on May 1. They'
based their decision on the traditional "quarantine policy" of the Anti-Defamation League and other majorJewish organizations such as the American-Jewish
Committee and the Jewish Federation of Chicago. In essence, to quarantine is
to ignore and avoid a demonstration in the hope that it will pass away without
causing disturbance and without attaining widespread publicity. At this meeting of leaders in April 1977, not one local leader (including the rabbis) dissented from the quarantine policy decision.
Yet the leaders had not anticipated the virulent reaction of the survivor
community. As word spread around the community, survivor resistance and
threats of counter-demonstration violence mushroomed, forcing the village to
abandon the quarantine policy and to seek legal means of keeping the Nazis
out. Once again, Collin asked the ACLU to litigate on his behalf, and the famous court battle over Skokie commenced.
Id. (footnote omitted).
15. See Neuborne & Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Border and
the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 719 (1985).
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Society of Friends. 16
Moreover, even if officials as a class tend to be no more intolerant
than most other persons, the fact that officials wield the coercive authority of the state makes their intolerance a matter of special concern.
What engenders the fortress mentality in first amendment theory is the
deadly combination of intolerance and power. That mentality may be
justified whether or not the latter feeds the former. Bollinger's collapsing of the phenomenon of official intolerance into the larger phenomenon of general intolerance would be persuasive only if officials were
viewed as the passive instruments of the general populace so far as the
question of speech regulation is concerned.
Bollinger is not oblivious to the special considerations that influence how officials respond to speech. He even mentions a "limited fortress model" that focuses on just this problem (p. 91). But his critique
of the fortress model depends on the claim that official intolerance is
predominantly the product of general intolerance. For instance, he
finds the fortress model unacceptable partly because it is premised on a
view of human nature that emphasizes the power of irrational, aggressive impulses and minimizes the role of reason in shaping behavior.
This view Bollinger regards as disturbingly pessimistic, even defeatist,
and also somewhat inconsistent with the high regard for reason that is
commonly invoked to justify the claim that speech is an especially valuable human activity. However, a limited fortress model that derives
from a recognition of the special impulses to intolerance to which officials are prone need not be premised on a pessimistic view about the
importance of reason generally or about the character of the ordinary
person. In addition, Bollinger objects to the paternalism he discerns in
the fortress model, the assumption of superiority that leads to analysis
in terms of "we" and "they." There is, to be sure, a "we-they" mentality underlying the limited fortress model as well, but the objection to
paternalism seems to me to lose much of its force when the "they"
whose instincts must be checked by the "we" who invoke constitutional
principles consists of the population of government officials who hold
extraordinary power and are subject to extraordinary pressures.
Thus, I do not think Bollinger succeeds in this book in discrediting
the fortress approach, though he surely gives its proponents (among
whom I count myself) much to think about. It is important, moreover,
whether an approach can be defended that emphasizes, as do both the
classical and fortress models, the coercive rather than the pedagogic
and symbolic dimensions of speech regulation. For the general tolerance theory that Bollinger develops as an alternative to the classical and
fortress models is not without problems of its own.
16. See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1974);
Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d
Cir. 1975).

1987]

THE TOLERANT SOCIETY

Some of those problems relate to one of its fundamental premises.
In Bollinger's view, a central function of first amendment adjudication
is to "work toward the correction of a perceived general defect in our
intellectual makeup" (p. 120). Like Meiklejohn before him, Bollinger
wants courts to participate in the forging of the democratic personality.
That the particular type of personality he seeks is more complex than
Meiklejohn's democratic man raises serious questions ofjudicial capacity, to which I shall turn shortly. But even if it were feasible for courts
to play a major role in shaping the intellectual makeup of the general
population, is that a function that any organ of the state ought to
undertake?
At least since Plato spelled out in such vivid detail his program for
shaping the intellectual character of the citizenry, it has been a central
problem of political philosophy what role the state should play in teaching its subjects how to think. Public schools, government information
campaigns relating to health and safety, and judicial doctrines designed
to discredit racist attitudes as well as disallow racist actions are only a
few examples of the many ways in which liberal states assume educational functions. Teaching is an inescapable attribute of governing.
This is not to say, however, that limits on the teaching function of the
state are not possible or desirable. The theory of constitutional democracy posits an important conceptual separation between the individual
and the state. Orwellian imagery is so powerful precisely because control over one's own thoughts represents one of the last redoubts of the
individual personality. I believe the status of the first amendment as a
cultural symbol also can be traced to this notion. At the least, it must
be counted a problematic feature of the general tolerance theory that it
is based on an expansive conception of the role of government in shaping the attitudes of the citizenry.
Bollinger alludes briefly to this problem when he invokes Isaiah
Berlin's famous distinction between negative and positive liberty, which
is based on the difference between "freedom from" and "freedom
to."1 7 The classical and fortress models, derived from the conventional
liberal thought of the Enlightenment, view the freedom of speech as
freedom from the coercive impact of regulation by the state. The general tolerance theory, on the other hand, views the freedom of speech
as freedom to develop the positive capacity for tolerance. The ideal of
positive liberty, prominent in the thought of Plato, Rousseau, and
8
Marx, is sometimes said to carry the seeds of totalitarianism.'
Bollinger acknowledges this concern but finds it inapplicable to the
general tolerance theory, which embodies a uniquely safe strategy for
pursuing the goal of positive liberty:
17. See I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty (1969).
18. See id. at 134; E. Barker, Introduction to J. Rousseau, Social Contract xxxviii
(E. Barker ed. 1960); 1 K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: Plato 86-89
(1962); 2 K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: Hegel and Marx 310 (1962).
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What [Berlin] did not see, however, is how the two conceptions of negative and positive freedom could be yoked together, the former in service to the latter; how the
establishment of a zone or field of negative freedom could become a source or method of striving for some sense of positive
liberty (pp. 173-74).
Because it promotes the positive intellectual capacity it seeks only by
the device of restricting the coercive power of the state, Bollinger regards the general tolerance theory as more or less devoid of totalitarian
implications.
I am not so sure. I agree with Bollinger that the dangers inherent
in the teaching role of government are greatly reduced when all the
agents of the state are empowered to do is teach noncaptive audiences
by setting an example. I also think it is wrong when sifting for the
seeds of totalitarianism to regard the judiciary, with its limited resources and narrow scope of operation, as presenting a threat comparable to that posed by other organs of the state. Nevertheless, one of the
cardinal functions of a constitutional tradition is to give continuing expression and contemporary meaning to the liberal principle that the
power of the state is limited by the obligation to respect the autonomy
and individuality of its citizens. 19 Even if no concrete scenario is evident regarding how adoption of the general tolerance theory could
pave the way for totalitarianism, the premise that government should
try to shape the "intellectual character" of the citizenry has disturbing
overtones that make it a questionable starting point for interpretation
of the first amendment.
I do not want to make too much of this objection. When the teaching enterprise of first amendment adjudication is confined to more discrete endeavors, such as emphasizing the distinction between toleration
and weakness or keeping fresh in the public mind certain object lessons
relating to the abuse of power, I am comfortable with the idea ofjudge
as pedagogue. It is the ambitious and comprehensive catechism that
Bollinger wants taught that gives me pause. For he seeks an educational experience that will influence the way persons conduct themselves across a wide range of social interaction. He speaks not of
lessons or precepts but of character formation.
The complexity of the democratic personality that the general tolerance theory seeks to develop also raises a host of practical concerns.
As any teacher knows, there are limits to how detailed, subtle, and
multi-layered the instruction can be if it is to have a genuine impact on
the thinking of students. Much depends on the setting: more complex
pedagogic endeavors can be undertaken in specialized seminars than in
introductory courses. I do not think the setting of first amendment adjudication lends itself to ambitious teaching. Particularly that is true
19. See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204,
214-16 (1972).
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when, as under the general tolerance theory, the intended audience is
the public at large rather than a narrower class of persons such as disappointed litigants, public officials, or groups that exhibit unusual qualities of intolerance.
Recall that Bollinger objects to what he considers the simplistic
and exaggerated rhetoric of the first amendment tradition. He thinks
the stirring passages from the free speech opinions of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Black have had a negative effect on the development of
the general capacity for tolerance because those passages censor the
complexity of the issues they address. Other much-quoted first amendment opinions, such as Justice Brennan's majority opinion in New York
Times v. Sullivan 20 and Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Cohen v.
California,2 1 are vulnerable, he says, to the same criticism (pp. 206,
223-24, 231). These judges may have tutored the general population
on the subject of tolerance, but they taught the wrong lesson.
I think it is no accident that the most influential opinions in the
first amendment tradition employ a rhetoric that is unsubtle, unambiguous, inattentive to complexities, and to a degree unbalanced. Those
opinions teach simple lessons, and they do so by ignoring counterarguments and suppressing misgivings. I think the lessons are valid and
important enough that a certain pedagogic license in teaching them is
justifiable. Whether or not I am right about that, I believe experience
suggests that the impact of constitutional rhetoric tends to correlate
with how loud, clear, and striking is its message.
Bollinger offers no example of a first amendment opinion from any
court that displays the quality of mind he thinks ought to be taught. If
he could find such an example-the Frankfurter concurring opinion in
Dennis v. United States22 might be a candidate-I doubt whether the
opinion could be shown to have had any significant influence on the
way any segment of the population thinks about the question of tolerance. Judicial opinions are read by only a tiny fraction of the population. The important opinions are talked about, of course, in larger
circles, and occasionally a judge's observations may be quoted or paraphrased widely. But then, I am confident, the richness and subtlety, the
balance and proportion and complexity an opinion may exemplify are
sure to be lost in-translation.
Perhaps I misinterpret the scenario of instructional impact that
Bollinger envisions. Although he is generally admirable in his willingness both to refine his ideas and to face up to problems, the book contains an uncharacteristic ellipsis on this question of exactly how what
courts do and say is supposed to affect the thinking of the ordinary
person. Perhaps the quality of mind the general tolerance theory seeks
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
22. 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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to develop in the ordinary person is not to be achieved primarily by
having him hear and attempt to decipher the complex messages put out
by courts relating to how natural, at times proper, but dangerous, often
disproportionate, and always ambiguous is the response of intolerance.
Possibly it is the experience of being forced by the writ of law to tolerate
speech under certain conditions that is to be the chief source of instruction for the ordinary person. If so, the role of subtle and complicated
patterns of judicial thought would be simply to help judges pick the
right situations, from a pedagogic perspective, for conducting these experiential lessons in toleration.
But then the success of the teaching endeavor depends on the capacity of the general population to draw from the experience of enforced toleration the proper conclusions. Bollinger realizes that the
pedagogy could misfire. He inveighs against inflexible doctrines precisely because he believes that only under certain social conditions will
thejudical protection of unpopular speech have a salutary effect on the
attitudes of the population:
The simple fact that legal coercion against speech activity has
been checked does not necessarily mean [intolerance] will not
resurface in other forms. Because the free speech results are
likely to be considered highly arbitrary and socially unacceptable, the intolerance may actually be stimulated-and become
excessive-in other areas of social interaction (p. 195).
Only if courts attempt to teach tolerance when conditions are suitable,
and then only if the judges find "the right voice" in which to conduct
the lesson, does Bollinger expect the population to develop an appreciation of how intolerance is at once both desirable and dangerous, valuable as a form of self-expression yet difficult to keep in proportion.
I question whether this sophisticated perspective on intolerance
can be taught through the medium of adjudication-in any voice under
any social conditions. Moreover, the difficulties posed by the complexity of the lesson are compounded, I believe, by the complexity of the
strategy Bollinger proposes. By requiring extreme tolerance in the limited sphere of free speech, courts are supposed to help the general
population achieve a moderate degree of tolerance in other spheres of
social interaction. I wonder whether persons who draw a lesson from
the experience of being forced by law to be tolerant of speech are likely
to apply that lesson when later they respond to nonspeech conduct that
stimulates the impulse to intolerance. And if they do, will it be the lesson that the proper response lies somewhere between the extreme toleration that is required by law toward speech and the relatively low
degree of toleration that is enforced by law toward many forms of
conduct?
The problem is complicated even further by Bollinger's insistence
that judicial discourse adopt a candid idiom and refrain from "weaving
a set of deceptions" (p. 235). Presumably this means that courts should
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explain in their opinions that the extreme degree of protection accorded speech under the first amendment does not derive from the
judgment that speech acts are more valuable or less harmful than other
forms of conduct but rather from the judgment that treating similar
categories of acts differently can serve a pedagogic purpose. What lesson will the public draw if it is told that the degree of toleration required of it toward speech is indeed extreme, greater than would be
desirable were it not for the court's effort to dramatize the act of toleration in some isolated settings? Possibly such an awareness of the strategy will lead members of the general public to draw the desired
conclusion that the proper norm in other spheres is a more moderate
degree of toleration. But I am skeptical.
In sum, the project of shaping the intellectual character of the general populace is fraught with hazards and uncertainties. Even under the
best of conditions, it is exceedingly difficult to predict or control what
lessons the public will draw from dramatized instances of constitutional
litigation. I do not doubt that one of the functions of first amendment
adjudication is to teach. Bollinger has done us a service by exploring
that function in so fresh and probing a manner. But I remain convinced that teaching tolerance to the general population is not the most
important function of first amendment adjudication; protecting speakers and their audiences from the coercive consequences of government
regulation is.
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